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Executive summary
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) is 
engaged in a concerted effort to modernise its military into 
a service that’s capable of projecting a posture of credible 
external deterrence. This transformation effort has been 
developed in line with the concept of ‘rebuilding while 
performing’. Its overarching goal is to equip the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP) with the necessary capabilities to 
protect the territorial integrity of the state, offset evolving 
foreign defence challenges, and ensure the attainment of 
Manila’s strategic maritime interests—particularly as they 
relate to claims in the South China Sea (SCS).
The transformation will focus on four key areas: the full 
implementation of the Internal Peace and Security Plan 
(IPSP); organisational reforms with the goal of ensuring full 
transparency in military spending; strengthening the AFP’s 
territorial defence capabilities; and the development of a 
naval force that can protect Manila’s maritime interests in 
the West Philippine Sea. To that end, the GRP has prioritised 
three central innovations over the short to medium term.
First is the establishment of ‘appropriate strategic response 
forces’ in all three branches of the AFP to undertake 
integrated defensive missions and deter potential external 
threats that could harm the country’s core national security 
interests. To achieve this, the GRP is looking to institute a 
joint operational concept that will integrate capabilities 
across the sea, air, land and cyberspace domains.
Second is the creation of an enhanced command, control, 
communication, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) system to support joint strategic defence operations 
and improve situational awareness through the faster 
collection, structural fusion, analysis and dissemination of 
shared information. The same capabilities will also be used to 
provide intelligence-based and focused countermeasures for 
securing vital installations, energy facilities and international 
sea lanes that run through the Philippines’ territory and 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Third is the development of a modern satellite 
communications network to work alongside improved 
C4ISR platforms to give nationwide coverage for sovereignty 
surveillance and reconnaissance. The idea is broaden existing 
ties (or build new ones) with other nations and (where 
appropriate) private firms to create mutually beneficial 
arrangements that can be leveraged to share capabilities, 
systems, technology and personnel.
Two factors, in particular, have been instrumental in driving 
the reform process:
•	 A	more	benign	domestic	threat	environment. The 
Philippines has historically faced a wide array of 
internal security threats, which have ranged from 
communist-inspired insurgency and Moro Muslim 
ethno-religious separatism to Islamist jihadi terrorism. 
While these forces have yet to be totally overcome, the 
scale and scope of their operations have dramatically 
declined in recent years and none now pose a genuine 
threat to domestic stability.
•	 Heightened	territorial	competitiveness	in	the	SCS. The 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) has adopted an 
increasingly forward-leaning posture to enforce its 
self-proclaimed historical jurisdiction over the disputed 
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coastal defence system would be far cheaper and much less 
contentious. If properly configured, such a network could 
empower a capable and self-reliant partner that is more 
readily positioned to independently resist pressure from 
Beijing. It would also reinforce and focus Washington’s own 
strategic intent—officially announced in January 2012—to 
‘pivot’ towards Asia while avoiding force postures that could 
provoke the PRC into taking unilateral military action of the 
sort that could threaten US and allied interests or quickly 
escalate out of control.
Moves by the GRP to enhance the Philippines’ external force 
posture in the SCS also have implications for Australia. So 
far, virtually all of Canberra’s security assistance has been 
directed to boosting the capabilities and professionalism 
of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Now that Manila has 
reoriented its defence priorities from internal to external 
security, an argument could be made that Australia should 
realign the focus of its aid package to enable a sharper focus 
on promoting AFP force projection.
Doing so, however, would be unwise for at least two reasons. 
First, in many ways the PNP remains a relatively weak entity 
that’s beset by corruption, a dearth of basic investigative 
skills, a lack of intra-agency coordination and inadequate 
intelligence coordination. The Australian Federal Police 
has instituted several capacity-building and training 
programs over the past 10 years to address these problems. 
Prematurely terminating ongoing initiatives would not only 
be a significant waste of resources, it could also lead to a 
domestic enforcement void in the Philippines that once again 
allows internal threat actors to assume prominence.
Second, it could exacerbate tensions with Australia’s main 
economic partner—China. Adopting an explicit posture of 
military support for Philippine claims in the SCS would be 
likely to reinforce a perception in Beijing that Canberra is 
fully committed to working with Washington in strategically 
containing the PRC in the Asia–Pacific. At best, this could 
complicate the consolidation of future economic and trade 
agreements; at worst, it could encourage China to search 
for new (non-Australian) sources of energy resources and 
alternative markets for its exports.
Paracel and Spratly islands, Scarborough Shoal and 
Macclesfield Bank. This assertive stance has brought 
it into direct conflict with the Philippines (as well as 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei), as the wider maritime 
space that Beijing claims encompasses areas that fall well 
within Manila’s EEZ.
President Benigno Aquino III has sought to address Beijing’s 
claims in the SCS by committing to a fast-track defence 
transformation. However, his administration’s planned 
upgrades are unlikely to be enough to credibly deter PRC 
assertiveness in the short term, and the government has 
yet to articulate a viable strategy for overcoming the fiscal 
constraints that a complete remodelling of the AFP would 
require over the medium term. In light of this predicament, 
are there alternative, more cost-effective, approaches that 
could be considered?
One viable solution is to revisit current and future 
procurement plans for advanced aircraft and combat ship 
capabilities and instead concentrate available national 
resources on creating an effective land-based system 
of anti-ship missiles (ASMs). Establishing an integrated 
network of this sort would be far cheaper than a complete 
defence transformation. It would also require fewer 
specialised personnel, equipment and facilities than a single 
high-performance fighter squadron and so could be put 
into service far more quickly. Properly configured, a system 
of ASMs could ensure the security of the vital Malampaya 
Natural Gas and Power Project—which supplies nearly half 
of Luzon’s electricity—and also provide adequate coverage 
of Manila’s claims in the Spratlys and possibly even the 
Scarborough Shoal.
The US, which has a long and established history of security 
ties with the Philippines, has a vested interest in supporting 
the GRP’s current defence transformation plans, as this could 
help to counter Beijing’s assumed intent to exert uncontested 
sovereignty over the SCS. However, actively assisting Manila 
in procuring advanced aviation and naval platforms in the 
numbers required to credibly offset China’s growing military 
strength would be both expensive and potentially dangerous, 
further straining what’s already a stressed political 
relationship. Helping with the establishment of a mobile 
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thrust of American assistance was to create a reliable and 
competent coalition partner that was capable of strategically 
and independently neutralising the wide array of internal 
security challenges it was then facing, so that attention 
could subsequently turn to meeting regional security and 
defence responsibilities.4
PDR was meant to complement the earlier National Internal 
Security Plan (NISP), which prescribed the general political 
framework and policy guidelines for coordinating, integrating 
and accelerating all government action against domestic 
threats in the 21st century. These were prioritised as:
1. counterinsurgency (COIN), primarily directed against the 
New People’s Army (NPA) of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP)
2. counter-separatism, addressing the challenge from the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
3. counterterrorism, against both local and regional Islamist 
extremist organisations—notably Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
4. counter-destabilisation, which involved measures to 
prevent the overthrow of the government.5
Capability Upgrade Program
The CUP is an 18-year effort aimed at retooling the AFP to 
allow it to comprehensively neutralise—or strategically 
contain—domestic threat groups so that the emphasis of 
military action can progressively switch to external territorial 
defence and force projection. The program is divided into 
three 6-year plans:
•	 2006–2011, which deals with internal security operations 
and the acquisition of equipment that can be brought to 
bear against the CPP–NPA, MILF, ASG and JI.
•	 2012–18, which focuses on strategically containing 
domestic rebels (to 2016) and then gradually transitioning 
from internal security operations to external defence
•	 2019–2024, which concentrates on the full consolidation 
of territorial defence and the development of capabilities 
that can be applied to regional peacekeeping.6
As can be seen, the first 10 years of the CUP (2006–2016) 
are devoted to internal security operations and the 
appropriation of hardware that can be employed in COIN/
1   Philippine defence: reform and 
transformation
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) is 
engaged in a concerted effort to modernise its military into 
a service that’s capable of projecting a posture of credible 
external deterrence. This transformation effort has been 
developed in line with the concept of ‘rebuilding while 
performing’. Its overarching goal is to equip the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP) with the necessary capabilities to 
protect the territorial integrity of the state, offset evolving 
foreign defence challenges, and ensure the attainment of 
Manila’s strategic maritime interests—particularly as they 
relate to claims in the SCS.1
The program is the successor to and a ‘fast-track’ 
continuation of two security-sector reform initiatives 
that were initiated under the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 
administration in the post-9/11 era: Philippine Defense 
Reform (PDR) and the Capability Upgrade Program (CUP). 
The former provides the ‘software’ to foster individual and 
professional competence in the resource management of the 
defence establishment, while the latter aims at identifying 
the ‘hardware’ for maximising the effectiveness of the AFP as 
a military organisation.2
Philippine Defense Reform
Responsibility for PDR fell to the Philippines Department of 
National Defense (DND), which set up an AFP Modernization 
Office to coordinate and redirect military reform in 
accordance with a multi-year defence planning system. 
This long-range scheme, developed with US assistance, was 
divided into three discrete phases:
•	 2004–2005, which was devoted to creating a reform 
structure and defining standard processes
•	 2005–2008, which focused on empowering the AFP 
through resources and training
•	 2008–2011, which sought to institutionalise and sustain 
the reform process by integrating, evaluating and 
refining improvements.3
The US played an integral role in supporting PDR, providing 
both funding (US$41 million between 2004 and 2007) 
and subject matter input to the creation of a revamped 
battalion retraining program for the military. The major 
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Table 1: Philippines Air Force fixed-wing assets, 2012
Type Role Number  
in service
OV-10A Bronco Light attack / COIN 4
OV-10C Light attack / COIN 5
SF-260 TP Light attack / COIN 5
C-130 B Hercules Transport 5
C-130 H Hercules Transport 2
L-100-20 Hercules Transport 2
N22B Nomad Missionmate Transport 1
F-27-200 Friendship Light attack / VIP 
transport
2
F28 MK3000 VIP transport 1
S.211 Trainer / light attack 12
T-41B Mescalero Trainer 15
T-41D Mescalero Trainer 2
SF-260F Trainer 18
Commander 690A Mapping 1
Source: Jane’s World Air Forces, no. 35, IHS, London, 2012, p. 510.
Table 2: Philippines Air Force rotary-wing assets, 2012
Type Role Number  
in service
520 MG Attack 12
AUH-76 Attack 3
S-70A Black Hawk Utility 1
S-76A Black Hawk Utility 1
UH-1H Iroquois Multi-role 44
205A Utility 5
412 EP Utility 4
412 SP Utility 2
 
Source: Jane’s World Air Forces, no. 35, IHS, London, 2012, p. 510.
To achieve that objective, the AFP Modernization Act was 
passed in 2012. The legislation set out a state policy to 
transform the defence forces according to seven broad 
strategic objectives, four of which directly relate to 
external relations:
•	 To develop the AFP’s capability to uphold the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the Philippines and to 
secure the national territory from all forms of intrusion 
and encroachment
•	 To develop the AFP’s capacity to assist civilian agencies 
in the preservation of the national patrimony, including 
the Philippines’ living and non-living marine, submarine, 
counterterrorism settings. Assets that have been emphasised 
include utility/attack helicopters, sniper and assault rifles, 
patrol-killer medium boats for coastal operations, and 
ancillary equipment such as body armour, field radio sets 
and night-vision goggles.7
The defence transformation
While both PDR and the CUP were directed to modernising 
the AFP, the focus was always on internal security operations 
on the twin assumptions that domestic groups constituted 
the main threat to the stability of the state and that the 
GRP wouldn’t face an external enemy until at least 2018. 
As a result, the armed forces were never endowed with the 
means for projecting force, much less providing credible 
deterrence—even if that was the long-term goal of the overall 
reform process.
In terms of assets, this was and continues to be patently 
clear. In late 2005, the GRP decommissioned the last of its 
F-5A fighters, which denuded the Philippines Air Force (PAF) 
of all air offensive/defensive platforms and left it only with 
antiquated, slow-moving, light attack aircraft, transportation 
carriers, training planes and helicopters (see Tables 1 and 2). 
The Philippines Navy is in a similar state of disrepair. While 
it operates scores of coastal patrol boats (mainly to support 
army COIN operations), the core of its offshore fleet consists 
of two Gregorio del Pilar class frigates procured from the US, 
three Jacinto class corvettes obtained from the UK following 
the dissolution of the Royal Navy’s Hong Kong Squadron, 
another eight American Rizal/Miguel class corvettes and a 
World War II-era destroyer (the Rajah	Humabon). Equipped 
with limited armaments, such as 76 mm auto cannons, 
and lacking any type of anti-ship/anti-missile defences or 
integrated sensors, these vessels would have marginal value 
in a modern naval battle.8
One of the main priorities of the current Aquino III 
administration is to address this situation. On assuming 
office in 2010, the new president vowed to overhaul and 
upgrade a defence establishment that in many respects had 
become Southeast Asia’s military laggard.9 Although Aquino 
confirmed that all projects initiated under PDR would be 
completed as scheduled, he committed to fast-tracking the 
ongoing CUP to allow for an immediate shift from internal 
security operations to external territorial defence.
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First is the establishment of ‘appropriate strategic response 
forces’ in all three branches of the AFP to undertake 
integrated defensive missions and deter potential external 
threats that could harm the country’s core national security 
interests. To achieve this outcome, the GRP is looking to 
institute a joint operational concept that will integrate 
capabilities across the sea, air, land and cyberspace domains 
(Table 4).
Second is the creation of an enhanced command, 
control, communication, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) system to support strategic 
defence operations and improve situational awareness 
through the faster collection, structural fusion, analysis and 
dissemination of shared information. Those capabilities 
will also be used to provide intelligence-based and 
focused countermeasures for securing vital installations, 
energy facilities (such as the Malampaya Deep Water 
Gas-to-Power Project15), and international sea lanes that 
run through Philippine territory and the surrounding EEZ of 
the archipelago.
To this end, the DND has prioritised:
•	 joint and interagency command and control capabilities 
to facilitate all shaping activities and prevent armed 
threat groups from gaining advanced military assets
•	 area mechanisms for the joint coordination of procedures, 
systems and, where necessary, command and control to 
plan and conduct complex interagency operations
•	 expanded command and control capabilities to discern 
appropriate force levels for use against internal and 
external threat groups.
Third is the development of a modern satellite 
communications network to work alongside improved C4ISR 
platforms to provide nationwide coverage for sovereignty 
surveillance and reconnaissance. The idea is to broaden 
existing strategic partnerships (or build new ones) with other 
nations and (where appropriate) private firms to create 
mutually beneficial arrangements that can be leveraged to 
share capabilities, systems, technology and personnel.16
mineral, forest and other natural resources located within 
its territory and exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
•	 To improve the AFP’s ability to work with other 
government agencies in the enforcement of domestic 
and foreign policies as well as international conventions 
against maritime piracy, white slavery, smuggling, 
drug trafficking, hijacking of aircraft and seacraft and 
the transport of toxic and other ecologically harmful 
substances occurring in or near Philippine territory
•	 To develop the AFP’s capability to fulfil the country’s 
international commitments.10
The AFP’s new Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP)—
Oplan	Bayanihan (Operation Plan Community Spirit)—also 
recognises the need to overhaul the armed forces. This 
initiative provides for a three-year transition period, during 
which the military will develop the capabilities required 
for unilateral defensive operations against external armed 
aggression.11 The long-term objective of the IPSP is to 
establish a comprehensive system of border security, 
anchored on the existing National Coast Watch System 
(Table 3), the PAF, the Philippines Navy and the Philippines 
Coast Guard, that will extend from the GRP’s territorial waters 
to its contiguous EEZ.12
Taking its cue from the AFP Modernization Act and Oplan	
Bayanihan, a joint DND–AFP team has since formulated a 
long-term capability plan for the AFP, which is designed to 
modernise the armed forces’ technology and equipment 
and boost the professionalism of its personnel as an integral 
component of comprehensive security sector reform. To 
finance this effort, the executive has proposed an annual 
rolling budget of 8 billion pesos (roughly A$169 million) over 
five years, the lion’s share of which will go to the air force 
and navy.13
The current AFP Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Jessie 
Dellosa, has confirmed that the future direction of defence 
transformation will focus on four key areas: the full 
implementation of the IPSP; organisational reforms, with 
the goal of ensuring full transparency in military spending; 
strengthening the AFP’s territorial defence capabilities; 
and the development of a naval force that’s able to protect 
Manila’s maritime interests in the West Philippine Sea.14 To 
that end, the GRP has prioritised three central innovations 
over the short to medium term.
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Table 3: Philippine National Coast Watch System
Purpose Functions Components Command
Established under Executive 
Order 57, the National Coast 
Watch System will be ‘the central 
interagency mechanism for 
a coordinated and coherent 
approach on maritime issues and 
maritime security operations 
towards enhancing governance in 
the Philippines’ maritime domain”.
1. Gather, consolidate, synthesise 
and disseminate information 
relevant to maritime security.
2. Develop and maintain effective 
communications and information 
systems to enhance interagency 
coordination in maritime security 
operations.
3. Coordinate the conduct of 
maritime surveillance or response 
operations upon the request of 
a member agency or when an 
exigency arises.
4. Plan, coordinate, monitor, 
evaluate, document and report on 
the conduct of maritime security 
operations.
5. When so authorised, coordinate 
cross-border and multinational 
security cooperation.
6. Coordinate support for the 
prosecution of apprehended 
violators.
7. Conduct periodic assessments 
on maritime security.
Twenty offshore platforms that 
have both surveillance and 
interdiction capabilities and are 
equipped with radars, automated 
information systems, UHF radios, 
high-powered binoculars and 
infrared cameras.
Philippines Coast Guard assets:
•	 light patrol gunboats
•	 fixed-wing Islander aircraft.
Philippines Navy assets (‘drawn on 
an as-needed basis’):
•	 rigid-hull inflatable boats
•	 logistics support vessels
•	 Jacinoto class corvettes
•	 close attack craft.
Maritime Research Information 
Center:
•	 operational 24/7 with a staff 
of 18
•	 responsible for compiling 
strategic threat assessments 
and providing an informed and 
unified picture of the maritime 
environment in the Philippines.
 
Source: Author interviews, Maritime Research Information Center, August 2011.
Table 4: Capabilities for the development of strategic response forces
Capability Purpose
Three-tiered navy to undertake subsurface, surface and air warfare 
operations
Sea-denial and patrol to ensure the sovereignty of the Philippine 
archipelago and the country’s EEZ
Strategic Air Strike Force equipped with multi-role fighter aircraft and 
unmanned combat air vehicles capable of air interdiction, air combat 
manoeuvring, air-to-ground and air-to-ship missions
Gain and maintain air superiority over friendly and contested territories; 
eliminate an enemy’s military potential; support surface forces through the 
provision of air-delivered weapons
Adaptive, rapidly deployable expeditionary force (Brigade Battle 
Group) consisting of elements drawn from the army and marines
Undertake operations across the full conflict spectrum—from conventional 
to unconventional, symmetric to asymmetric, and high intensity to low 
intensity; contribute to the conduct of regional peacekeeping missions
Strategic sea- and airlift Support rapid deployment and expeditionary forces
Special operations forces organised, trained and equipped to support 
conventional military units
Provide a versatile military capability to defend Philippine national interests; 
act as a cost-effective force multiplier that can provide substantial leverage 
with reasonable effort and financial outlay; undertake unconventional 
guerrilla operations in the event of a foreign invasion
Air, land and sea missile platforms Enhance the firepower and lethality of strategic response forces
Land and sea mine platforms Support external/territorial defence operations, such as sea denial/
interdiction and infantry and mechanised missions 
 
Source: Department of National Defense (DND), Transforming the Department of National Defense to effectively meet the defense and security challenges of 
the 21st century, pp. 10–11.
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The communists
The NPA emerged as the armed wing of the CPP in 1968. 
The group’s stated aim is to replace the current political 
and economic order in the Philippines with a socialist 
system through a strategy of protracted people’s war. To 
achieve this objective, the movement has used all tactical 
means at its disposal, including military action, mass 
mobilisation and political lobbying.19 At the height of its 
strength, the NPA–CPP could count on 28,000 members 
organised into guerrilla fronts that were widely dispersed 
across the country. Through its legitimate wing, the National 
Democratic Front (NDF), the movement also managed 
to penetrate key sectoral organisations that were then 
leveraged to support the communist struggle, including 
youth groups, labour unions, churches, university student 
bodies and political parties (mainly by buying off corrupt 
congressional representatives).20
The majority (60%) of the NISP’s resources21 was always 
devoted to COIN efforts against the CPP–NPA. The 
organisation was deemed to be the main threat to the 
security of the Philippines because of its motivating goals 
(the overthrow of the government), geographical spread 
(nationwide) and infiltration of key state institutions. The 
GRP’s strategy emphasised a holistic approach to combating 
the communist insurgency that was based on five ‘hard’ 
coercive offensives and three ‘soft’ incentive programs 
(Table 5). The goal was to achieve a strategic victory over 
the CPP–NPA by 2010—defined as a 75% reduction in the 
movement’s strength, capability and influence, based on 
2007 figures.22 Although that hasn’t occurred—at least in 
strict numerical terms—the CPP–NPA is weaker today than 
at any time in the past. The movement now has fewer than 
The overall vision is to synchronise and institutionalise these 
upgrades to establish the entire DND as a single whole that’s 
fully capable of conducting joint maritime surveillance, 
defence and interdiction operations.17 As noted, a total of 
forty billion pesos (8 billion over five years) has so far been 
allocated for this effort, which will be used to finance up to 
24 modernisation projects that are due to be completed 
by mid-2016 (to coincide with the end of Aquino’s six-year 
term in office). The programs include the procurement of 
F-16 fighters, naval helicopters, frigates, patrol aircraft, 
patrol ships, multipurpose attack vessels, air-defence radar 
platforms and long-range surveillance planes. Among the 
most high-profile planned acquisitions will be the purchase 
of three decommissioned Hamilton class high-endurance 
cutters from the US Coast Guard (which can be retrofitted 
with RGM anti-ship cruise missiles) and up to twelve T/A-50 
surface attack aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries, 
worth around A$467 million.18
2   Internal and external developments
Two factors, in particular, have driven the GRP’s defence 
transformation policies: a radically altered internal threat 
environment and greater Chinese assertiveness in the SCS.
A reduced domestic threat environment
The Philippines has historically confronted a wide array 
of internal security dangers. As encapsulated in the NISP, 
these hazards have ranged from communist insurgency by 
the CPP and NPA, to the MILF-instigated ethno-nationalist 
separatism and ASG and JI Islamic extremism. While the state 
continues to confront residual challenges from those entities, 
their overall threat quotient has declined dramatically in 
recent years.
Table 5: National Internal Security Plan offensives and programs
COIN offensives COIN programs
Military: directed at degrading the operational capabilities of the NPA Amnesty: instituted to encourage CPP–NPA defections
Legal: aimed at securing the conviction of CPP–NPA cadres Social reintegration: focuses on the demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration of ‘repentant’ NPA cadres
Economic: focused on cutting the flow of funds to the CPP–NPA from 
sympathisers in the Philippines and abroad
Human rights: intended to boost the human rights awareness and 
understanding of the AFP and Philippines National Police
Political: Designed to wean local community organisations away from the 
CPP–NPA
Strategic communication/psychological: formulated to delegitimise 
CPP–NPA propaganda and promote the image of the Philippines as a 
socially caring state 
 
Source: NSC, Manila.
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constitutional ambit of the Philippine state—and the phased 
disarmament of MILF cadres, most of whom are expected 
to be integrated into the AFP or PNP.27 The deal marks the 
effective end of 30 years of warfare that has left more than 
120,000 people dead. Although the deal isn’t endorsed by 
renegade MILF elements—who have since formed their own 
faction in the guise of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Fighters28—or the MNLF which fears that the BJE will 
encroach on autonomy arrangements it secured under the 
terms of the Davao Consensus—it does represent a significant 
step forward in the stabilisation of the southern Philippines. 
Abu Sayyaf Group
The ASG (literally ‘bearer of the sword’), another splinter 
of the MNLF, was founded on Basilan Island in 1991 under 
the command of Abdurajak Janjalini. Originally known as 
the Al Harakat-ul Al Islamiya, the group has stated its goals 
as the eradication of all Christian influence in the southern 
Philippines and the creation of an independent Islamic state 
of Mindanao. 
Although originally predicated on localised religious 
separatist imperatives, the ASG quickly linked those 
objectives to the regional and global supremacy of Islam 
through armed struggle. The group was subsequently tied 
to Oplan	Bojinka—a multipronged terror plan hatched by 
Ramzi Yousef, a ‘freelance’ jihadi extremist and the convicted 
mastermind behind the 1993 attack against the World 
Trade Center in New York. The attack campaign was to 
have included the assassination of the Pope and President 
Clinton while they were visiting the Philippines in 1996, the 
coordinated bombings of Washington’s embassies in Manila 
and Bangkok, and the mid-air destruction of US commercial 
aircraft flying trans-Pacific routes from the American western 
seaboard. The plot was foiled only after volatile explosives 
ignited a fire in an apartment that Yousef was renting 
in Manila, forcing him to flee to Pakistan, where he was 
subsequently detained. Although the ASG suffered a setback 
in 1999 when Janjalini was killed during a police shoot-out, 
the group was re-energised in 2003 under the combined 
leadership of Janjalini’s younger brother, Khadaffy, and 
Jainal Antel Sali (aka Abu Soliman), who together oversaw 
a wave of deadly attacks and pre-empted strikes that were 
justified in the name of the global jihadi struggle against the 
West (Table 6).
5,000 cadres at its disposal, has suffered from the capture 
of many of its main leaders and has been driven from many 
towns and hamlets—retaining a presence in less than 5% 
of all barangays (the smallest local government unit).23 
Reflecting its degraded capacity, only around 20–30% of 
the CPP–NPA’s activity currently takes the form of classic 
guerrilla war, with the bulk of its action now rooted in 
extortion schemes (especially evident during elections) and 
propaganda campaigns organised by the NDF to discredit 
the GRP.
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
The MILF is a breakaway movement of the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), which was established in 1972 
and historically served as the main vehicle for pursuing the 
national Moro struggle in the southern Philippines. The latter 
entity eventually signed a peace agreement with the GRP 
(the Davao Consensus) in 1996, which provided for a limited, 
four-province Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.24
The MILF was established in 1984 under the hardline 
leadership of Hashim Salamat with the aim of creating 
an independent Islamic state in all areas of the southern 
Philippines where Moro Muslims have traditionally been a 
majority. The group has an estimated 11,000 men under 
arms, organised into 14 main base commands and equipped 
with a wide array of weapons, including M1 Garand, M16 
and M14 assault rifles, M203 grenade launchers, landmines, 
locally manufactured M79 rocket-propelled grenades, .50 and 
.60-caliber machine guns and anti-tank munitions.25 Since its 
emergence, it has spearheaded the ethno-religious separatist 
campaign in Mindanao.
Following the death of Hashim Salamat in 2003, the MILF 
moderated its goal of outright independence under the more 
pragmatic and politically astute leadership of Al Haj Murad 
Ebrahim, who understood that a guarantee of comprehensive 
autonomy was the greatest concession that could realistically 
be extracted from Manila. This more accommodating stance 
opened the way for Malaysian-brokered negotiations that 
were aimed at resolving a broad array of issues pertaining 
to the creation of a future self-governing Moro Muslim 
homeland.26 Although talks fluctuated over six years, a final 
agreement was signed in March 2014. The accord provides for 
the establishment of a so-called Bangsamoro Judicial Entity 
(BJE)—an autonomous region for Moro Muslims within the 
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It defined its aims in both local and regional terms. The 
immediate goal was the institution of full sharia law in 
Indonesia. This was to be the first step of a wider objective 
that sought the creation of a pan-Southeast Asian caliphate 
embracing Brunei, Malaysia, southern Thailand and the 
southern Philippines. At its height in 1999 and 2000, JI 
was thought to have a hardcore membership of around 
2,000 activists plus some 5,000 passive sympathisers.29 
Until 2005, the group was recognised as the most dangerous 
terrorist organisation in Southeast Asia, taking responsibility 
for some of the most lethal extremist attacks that have 
ever occurred in the region (Table 7). JI’s most destructive 
operation, the Bali bombings in October 2002, remain the 
most deadly jihadi attack since al-Qaeda’s 9/11 strikes in 
the US.
Although Indonesia-based, JI had a strong presence in the 
southern Philippines. The movement not only benefited 
from open access to militant camps run by the MILF, it also 
established robust operational and logistical ties with both 
the MILF and the ASG. For at least five years, the region acted 
as a strategic rear base for JI where attacks were planned, 
munitions procured and cell members trained.30
However, the threat from JI has greatly diminished in recent 
times. Among other factors, this reflects the following:
•	 Highly effective counterterrorism drives in Indonesia, 
which have eliminated some of the group’s most 
effective commanders. Compounding these losses was 
the defection of JI’s spiritual leader, Bashir, in 2008, 
who went on to establish a rival group—the Jemaah 
Ansharut Tauhid.31
Table 6: Selected high-profile attacks and plots attributed to ASG, 2004–2007
Date Incident
February 2004 Firebombing of Philippine SuperFerry	14
This attack, which was a joint operation between ASG and JI, left 
116 people dead and remains the most destructive act of maritime 
terrorism in history.
February 2005 Coordinated attacks in Davao City, General Santos City and Manila 
(known as the ‘Valentine’s Day’ bombings)
March 2005 Pre-empted strikes on restaurants and nightclubs popular with 
foreigners in Manila’s central business district
March 2006 Bombing of a crowded supermarket in Jolo
November 2007 Assassination of congressional representative Wahab Akbar
Although the motivation for the assassination hasn’t been fully 
established and the ASG never claimed responsibility for Akbar’s 
killing, police intelligence officials believe that militants connected 
with the group perpetrated the operation.
 
Largely due to concerns that the ASG was being leveraged 
to consolidate a beachhead for regional jihadi extremism 
connected to the global ambitions of al-Qaeda, the US 
dramatically stepped up its counterterrorism security 
engagement with the GRP after 9/11. Under Operation 
Enduring Freedom—Philippines, Washington provided 
funding and training to support a concerted campaign to 
crush the group and its support networks across Mindanao 
and adjoining islands. This effort has substantially degraded 
the ASG’s operational tempo and ideological unity, which 
has been further diminished by an increasingly serious 
leadership void since 2007: Khadaffy died in September 2006 
from injuries sustained in a firefight with the AFP and four 
months later, Abu Soliman was fatally shot by a special forces 
unit. The loss of these commanders has engendered growing 
criminalisation within the ASG’s ranks, which is now arguably 
the group’s defining trait as no viable replacement(s) with 
both ideological and ‘military’ credentials has ever emerged.
Today, the ASG is thought to number no more than 
75–100 adherents. These rebels are split among roving 
kidnap-for-ransom bands scattered across Basilan and 
Jolo and are largely unable to influence anything beyond 
Zamboanga, much less the southern Philippines as a whole.
Jemaah Islamiyah
JI is an Indonesian-based jihadi organisation with purported 
historical links to al-Qaeda. The movement was established 
as a dedicated entity in January 1993 under the combined 
leadership of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. 
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will be able to carry more than 1,000 troops and is likely to 
enter the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in the near 
future.33 All of these developments and assets—together 
with the explicit use of ‘soft’ power (diplomatic, educational, 
cultural and economic tools of influence)—appear to be 
directed at increasing the PRC’s projection and reach into the 
Asia–Pacific, while simultaneously limiting the scope for the 
US to do the same.34
Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the SCS—a 
region of 1,350,000 square miles that stretches from 
Singapore to the Taiwan Strait and contains more than 
250 small islands, atolls, cays, shoals and reefs. Here, Beijing 
has adopted an increasingly forward-leaning posture 
to enforce its ‘historical’ jurisdiction over the disputed 
Paracel and Spratly islands, the Scarborough Shoal and the 
Macclesfield Bank. Overall the PRC asserts ownership over 
around 90% of the SCS, basing its claims on initial discovery 
and historical disputes that date back to the 2nd century 
BC. A map drawn up by the Kuomintang in 1947 also depicts 
nine unconnected dotted lines that cover the vast majority 
of the SCS, which Beijing argues provides further support to 
vindicate Chinese sovereignty over the region’s waters and all 
land and submarine features within it.35
The PRC has taken several steps to give concrete expression 
to its claims in the SCS. In 2007, the government raised the 
status of the administrative authority overseeing the Paracel 
and Spratly islands to that of a county-level metropolis in 
Hainan Province. Three years later, the PRC listed its claims 
in the SCS as among its ‘core national interests’ alongside 
Taiwan, for the first time.36 Then in 2012, Beijing not only 
announced that the Spratlys, Paracels and Macclesfield 
Bank had become a Chinese area known as Sansha City 
(with its own governing officials), but also confirmed that it 
was dispatching a military garrison to guard those living on 
the islands.37 
Table 7: High-profile Jemaah Islamiyah attacks, 2002 to 2005
Attack Deaths Injuries
First Bali bombings, 12 October 2002 202 209
Bombing of JW Marriott Hotel, Jakarta, 5 August 2003 12 150
Bombing of Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 9 September 2004 11 Over 200
Bombing of SuperFerry	14, 27 February 2004 116 320
Second Bali bombings, 1 October 2005 25 129
•	 Mainstream Islamic opposition to JI (because of the 
large numbers of Muslims killed in its attacks), which 
has caused it to concentrate almost all of its activity on 
rebuilding local support networks.
•	 The MILF peace process, which has placed considerable 
pressure on Murad to ensure that the MILF has no 
association with any external extremist organisation.32
•	 The decimation of the ASG, which can no longer act as a 
strong local terrorist partner.
There are now probably no more than a handful of JI 
militants in the southern Philippines—all of who are almost 
certainly there in an effort to avoid arrest, rather than to 
reignite Islamist fervour and violence.
A more assertive China
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as the 
pre-eminent power in the Asia–Pacific region, dominating 
the trade in manufactured goods and remaining a prime 
source of foreign direct investment for emerging, developing 
and mature markets, including, notably, Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia. While the 
overall pace of Beijing’s economic rise is slowing, projected 
growth rates for the foreseeable future remain at 7.75% per 
year, which is higher than for any other OECD state.
China has leveraged its wealth to steadily enhance the 
country’s anti-access/area-denial platforms. The government 
has committed large amounts of money to upgrading and 
expanding its space and cyber C4ISR technologies in addition 
to constructing advanced combat aircraft, submarines, 
modern surface warships and land-attack and anti-ship 
ballistic and cruise missiles. In March 2012, the state-run 
China Shipbuilding Company revealed a new concept for the 
construction of a 120,000-ton amphibious assault vessel that 
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that it was merely exercising its indisputable right to prevent 
unauthorised activity in its sovereign waters.41
The Reed Bank incident was the first in a set of high-profile 
clashes between Manila and Beijing. In April 2012, vessels 
from the two countries engaged in a five-month stand-off 
near Scarborough Shoal, about 140 miles west of Luzon.42 
In February 2014, a Chinese coastguard vessel fired a water 
cannon on a Filipino fishing boat trawling in the region.43 
The following month, the PRC sent vessels to block two 
civilian supply boats attempting to deliver provisions to 
Filipino sailors stationed on a military ship that had been 
grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal since 1999.44 These 
and other incidents (Table 8) have galvanised concerns in 
Manila that Beijing is preparing to use its military to resolve 
the SCS unilaterally, on its own terms. Protecting Philippines’ 
claims has, as a result, emerged as a key—if not the highest—
external defence priority of the GRP.45
This assertive stance has brought it into direct conflict with 
the Philippines (as well as Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei), as 
the wider maritime space China claims includes areas that 
fall well within Manila’s EEZ. The most contentious region 
covers the Spratlys, which lie only a few hundred kilometres 
from Palawan and which were formally incorporated as 
part of the Philippines’ territory in 1978 (as the ‘Kalayaan 
Island Group’).38
China–Philippines tensions, which had been steadily 
growing since 2007, came to a head on 2 March 2011 after 
Beijing threatened to ram a seismic survey ship that Manila 
had commissioned to search for natural gas on Reed Bank, 
a group of small islets in the Spratly archipelago.39 Two 
days later, the GRP filed a protest with the PRC Embassy 
in Manila, demanding an explanation for the incident, and 
then announced a strengthening of its own garrison in the 
area.40 In what was widely regarded as a dismissive and 
condescending response, the Chinese Government stated 
Figure 1: China and the Philippines maritime claims in the South China Sea
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embarked on an expansion of its own armed forces through 
a massive A$140 billion defence budget—the largest of any 
state in Asia and dwarfing that of the GRP.49 Once complete, 
the build-up will significantly boost the PLA’s amphibious and 
aerial projection capabilities, allowing it to decisively impose 
control over contested waters in the South (and East) China 
seas. As Richard Fisher from the Center for a New American 
Security observes, credible deterrence would require, at 
a minimum:
… up to four squadrons (48) of F-16s upgraded to a 4+ 
generation capability. These upgrades should include 
actively electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and 
advanced weapons to blunt two Chinese aircraft carriers’ 
complement of approximately 50 expected 4+ generation 
J-15 carrier combat aircraft. To support this capability the 
PAF would also need more SAA/LIFT fighters and both 
ground-based and long-range radar and airborne radar 
to better manage combat operations. The Philippines 
Navy would also need more well-armed frigates and 
smaller corvette-size combatants and minesweepers. 
An affordable force of four to six mini-submarines would 
round-off a credible deterrent capability, and modern 
mini-submarines could be obtained from South Korea 
or Russia.50
Procuring these advanced platforms in the numbers required 
would far outstrip current GRP expenditure, possibly by 
as much as seven times.51 This would be an enormous 
undertaking for a country that’s sorely lacking in resources 
Table 8: Main South China Sea incidents, 2011–14
Date Incident
March 2011 Chinese patrol vessels interfere with Philippines-contracted oil exploration vessel near Reed Bank The GRP announces a 
strengthening of the garrison on the Spratly Islands and the acquisition of maritime assets.
Mid-May – 31 July 2011 China announces its annual fishing ban in the South China Sea.
June 2011 PRC naval exercise around the Spratly Islands. The Philippines renames the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea.
April–September 2012 Philippines–China confrontation at Scarborough Shoal.
Mid-May – 31 July 2012 China announces its annual fishing ban in the South China Sea
11 July 2012 A Chinese surface warship runs aground on Half Moon Shoal (also known as Hasa Hasa Shoal), part of the Spratly Islands 
group.
January 2013 The Philippines initiates arbitration proceedings at the International Court of Justice, contesting Chinese claims over the 
Second Thomas Shoal.
February 2014 Chinese coastguard vessel fires a water cannon on a Philippine fishing boat trawling waters near the Scarborough Shoal.
March 2014 Chinese vessels block two Philippines civilian ships attempting to deliver supplies to sailors on the Second Thomas Shoal. 
Manila submits a 4,000-page document to the International Court of Justice, detailing its arguments and evidence against 
China’s claims to the disputed shoal.
 
Source: Adapted from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2013, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2013, p. 414.
There’s little doubt that the improved internal security 
situation in the Philippines and Chinese actions in the 
SCS are principal factors driving the current reform and 
transformation process in the AFP. As one defence analyst 
observes: ‘While the AFP have made headway in reducing 
communist and secessionist forces [this was] achieved at the 
expense of an exponentially deteriorating capability to carry 
out even the most basic of territorial defence operations.’46 
A candid 2010 report from the AFP makes a similar point, 
stressing that the focus on internal security operations has 
diverted the armed forces from realising externally focused 
modernisation projects, to the extent that:
[T]he AFP’s overall capability to defend the country 
against external threats in maritime and air environments 
remains inadequate. This situation is nowhere more 
manifest than in the Kalayaan Island Group wherein 
the AFP is unable to prevent and respond to intrusion 
into our EEZ or show our resolve in defending areas we 
are claiming.47
3   Credible deterrence and the funding 
challenge
President Aquino has so far kept pace with the 
40-billion-peso modernisation process for the AFP, spending 
33.95 billion pesos in his first 17 months in office.48 However, 
the planned upgrades will almost certainly not be enough 
to deter Chinese assertiveness in the SCS. The PRC has 
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of this idea for procurements of American hardware and 
have even proposed leasing 4,000 ton, 29-knot Perry class 
guided-missile frigates that have the capacity for both 
close-to-shore coastal patrols and the long-range protection 
of the country’s maritime borders and EEZ.55 While this 
option may be fiscally more tenable than trying to modernise 
through outright purchases under such arrangements as the 
US Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales program, 
it’s still almost certainly beyond the budgetary means of the 
GRP. Moreover, by definition, leased equipment will never be 
under the full control of the AFP. Its appropriateness for an 
institutionalised program of long-term defence reform that’s 
fully owned by the GRP is therefore questionable.
A land-based anti-ship missile system as a 
cheaper alternative?
Given the Philippines’ funding constraints, is there a cheaper 
way for the country to enforce its claims in the SCS? One 
alternative that’s gaining currency is to reconsider current 
and future procurement plans for advanced aircraft and 
combat ship capabilities and, instead, divert resources to 
setting up an effective land-based system of long-range 
anti-ship missiles (ASMs). The idea is to have the network’s 
components situated along the western coast, on Palawan 
Island (which is just 450 kilometres from even the most 
distant Philippine claims in the Spratlys), or both. There 
are several platforms that could be located in those areas 
that have the range to deny Beijing access to both near and 
distant waters in this part of the South China Sea (Table 9). 
According to Felix Chang of the Foreign Policy Research 
Institute in Philadelphia, four batteries mounted on wheeled 
or tracked vehicles and dispersed along Palawan’s long 
road network would satisfy the GRP’s requirement to 
deliver the necessary massed firepower to penetrate PRC 
shipboard defences.56
A land-based ASM system would be relatively inexpensive, 
as even more costly projectiles, such as the Swedish-made 
RBS-15, come in at a unit price of around A$4 million and 
there are several cheaper alternatives. In addition there 
would be no need to procure advanced naval or air platforms, 
as the missiles would be delivered from the ground. Although 
airborne surveillance assets would be required to provide 
targeting data, an MH-60 R naval helicopter could achieve this 
with minimal financial outlay. Chang further notes that the 
PAF already has experience of operating rotary-wing assets 
and where 70% of the defence budget is typically consumed 
by salaries and allowances. Exacerbating problems are 
stipulations in the 1987 Constitution that prohibit the 
government from allocating more money to the DND than to 
the Department of Education. As one analyst observes:
[T]he Philippine military is not that large and was never 
designed or, more importantly, developed to provide 
for the defense of its expansive archipelagic territory. 
Many experts argue that billions of dollars would need 
to be invested to reconfigure the Philippine military into 
a credible defense force. However, with the closure of 
US bases and the resultant loss of lease revenue, the 
AFP must now rely on congressional appropriations and 
AFP modernization funds to invest in new equipment. 
These sources are not sufficient to carry through 
modernization plans.52
Options for transformation
In his 2013 State of the Nation address, President Aquino 
announced that he wished to pursue a more aggressive 
policy of defence transformation to allow for enhanced 
force projection in the SCS. He also said that doing so 
would require a far greater defence budget. However, 
the GRP has yet to articulate a clear strategy for meeting 
these fiscal demands. So far, only two courses of action 
have been proposed, and neither is a viable solution to the 
cost problem.
The first option is to look at entering into strategic 
partnerships with other government agencies and the 
private sector. As noted, this is already being considered for 
the establishment of a modern satellite communications 
network.53 However, such arrangements are still in their 
infancy and have so far been largely confined to agreements 
allowing the co-location of commercial telecommunication 
facilities in selected AFP camps and mountain-top radio relay 
stations. While the number of these joint ventures has grown 
in recent years, the payoff for the military has been more ‘in 
kind’ (information services) than in income.
The second option is to lease, rather than buy, the military 
equipment. This would enable the cash-starved AFP to save 
money on maintenance costs, while also allowing it to access 
more advanced platforms, such as long-range patrol aircraft, 
corvettes and high-calibre weapons systems.54 Philippine 
legislators have been seriously weighing the feasibility 
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Establishing an integrated network of land-based ASMs 
would involve a budget substantially less than the 
A$169 million that’s so far been allocated for defence 
transformation (and which is far below what’s actually 
needed to deter China). It would also require fewer 
specialised personnel, equipment and facilities than a single 
high-performance fighter squadron, and so could be put into 
service far more quickly. Properly configured, a system of this 
sort could ensure the security of the vital Malampaya Natural 
Gas and Power Project and provide adequate coverage 
of Manila’s claims in the Spratlys and possibly even the 
Scarborough Shoal.
from the same S-70 family that the HR-60 helicopter comes 
from, so there would be no need to create a wholly new spare 
parts inventory or training program to put them into service; 
they also have a surveillance range similar to that of an early 
warning aircraft, but at a quarter of the price.57
Aside from fiscal considerations, land-based ASMs have 
the added advantage of being hard to identify, track and 
neutralise. Not only are they mobile, which means that 
they can be hidden behind cover, their launch pads can be 
easily disguised (for example, the Russian Yakhont can be 
fired from a delivery vehicle that can be made to look like 
an ordinary shipping container). Moreover, the extensive 
Philippines shoreline would provide many places to position 
the missiles, significantly reducing their vulnerability to a 
decapitating counterstrike.58
Table 9: Selected anti-ship missiles capable of being launched from ground-based platforms
Designation Country of 
origin
Range (km) Guidance Launch 
platform
Launch  
engine
Sustaining 
engine
Speed (mach)
BrahMos PJ-10 India/Russia 300–500 INS, GPS, active/
passive radar
Air, ship,  
ground, 
submarine
SFR Liquid-fuelled 
ramjet
2.8–3.0
Otomat/Teseo 
Mk2 BlK4
Italy 180 INS, data-link, 
active radar
Ship, ground SFR Turbojet 0.9
RGM-84 
Harpoon Blk3
US 185 Active radar Air, ship,  
ground, 
submarine
SFR J402 turbojet 0.85
Type 88 Japan 180 INS, GPS Ground SFR Turbojet 0.94
RGM-109B 
Tomahawk
US 450 GPS, INS Ground, ship, 
submarine
SFR WR-402 turbojet 0.5–0.75
P-800 Yakhont Russia 120–300 Active/passive 
radar
Ground, ship, 
submarine
SFR Liquid-fuelled 
ramjet
2.5
RBS-15 Mk3 Sweden 200 INS, radio, 
altimeter, active 
radar
Ship, air,  
ground
SFR TR60-5 turbojet 0.9
Exocet MM40 
Blk3
France 180 INS, GPS Ship, air, 
ground, 
submarine
SFR TRI 40 turbojet 0.92
Hsiung Feng II Taiwan 160 INS, active radar 
with infrared 
seeker
Ship, ground SFR Turbojet 0.85
Naval Strike 
Missile
Norway 185 INS, active 
radar, GPS
Ship, ground SFR TRI 40 turbojet 0.88
INS = inertial navigation system; IIR = imaging infrared; GPS = global positioning system; SFR = solid fuel rocket.
Source: Adapted from Terrence Kelly, Anthony Atler, Todd Nichols, Lloyd Thrall, Employing land-based anti-ship missiles in the Western Pacific, RAND, 
Santa Monica, 2013, p. 22.
Rebuilding while performing: military modernisation in the Philippines 15
and military growth, which has galvanised Washington into 
reaffirming ties with its Asian partners, particularly the GRP. 
This was made clear in June 2011, when Ambassador Harry 
Thomas announced that ‘The Philippines and the US are 
longstanding treaty allies. We are strategic partners. We will 
continue to consult each other closely on the South China 
Sea, Spratly Islands and other issues.’61 Five months later, 
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Philippines 
Foreign Secretary underscored the continuing relevance of 
the Mutual Defense Treaty by issuing the Manila Declaration, 
which states that the two countries:
… reaffirm our shared obligations under the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. We expect to maintain a robust, balanced 
and responsive security partnership including cooperating 
to enhance the defense, interdiction and apprehension 
capabilities of the Philippines.62
Clinton further declared that her government was fully 
prepared to help the GRP enhance its coastal and offshore 
capabilities and other aspects of expeditionary power.63 
That commitment was given concrete expression a year later 
when Washington announced that the Philippines would 
receive US$40 million in Global Security and Contingency 
Fund money in a new bilateral assistance program to 
enhance maritime domain awareness in the SCS and 
surrounding areas.64
4   The defence transformation and the 
US alliance
The Philippines and the US have a long history of bilateral 
relations and common strategic purposes that date back 
to joint anti-Japanese operations during World War II. In 
1951, the two countries signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, 
committing each side to come to the other’s support in the 
event of an external attack. During the Cold War, the treaty 
provided a legal context for sanctioning the establishment 
of permanent American defence posts in the Philippines—
notably Clark Air Base just outside Manila and the Subic 
Bay Naval Station. While the bases generated domestic 
opposition that eventually forced their closure in 1991, 
security ties between the US and the Philippines remained 
strong and gained extra momentum after 9/11. As noted, 
fears that Southeast Asian militants were seeking to establish 
a regional beachhead for Islamist extremism in Mindanao 
and its surrounding islands spurred a massive influx of 
counterterrorism assistance and training (provided under 
Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines59); in addition it 
prompted President GW Bush to elevate the status of the GRP 
to that of a major non-NATO ally in 2003.60
Although the terrorist threat has ameliorated, it’s been 
replaced by a growing concern over the PRC’s economic 
Filipino and US Marines manoeuvre during a mock ‘beach assault’ scenario as part of the US–Philippines joint military exercise in San Antonio town , Zambales province, Northwest of Manila, 
Central Philippines, 9 May 2014 . © DENNIS M. SABANGAN/epa/Corbis
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Working with the Aquino administration to set up a mobile 
coastal defence system would be more financially viable and 
arguably less contentious, as it would not involve support for 
the establishment of an outward forward strike capability. It 
would also provide the Philippines with the necessary means 
to independently deter Chinese adventurism in the SCS, and 
hence preclude the need to renegotiate controversial basing 
agreements that ended in 1992. To that end, the US could 
make it easier for the GRP to acquire anti-ship ordinance and 
surveillance/detection platforms and encourage other allies, 
such as Japan and South Korea, to do the same. Helping to 
establish a capable and self-reliant partner in the Philippines 
that’s better positioned to independently resist Chinese 
pressure would have positive benefits for regional security. It 
would also reinforce and focus Washington’s strategic intent 
to pivot towards Asia, while avoiding force postures that 
could provoke the PRC to take unilateral military action of 
the sort that could threaten US and allied interests or quickly 
escalate out of control.
5   Implications for Australia
Moves by the Philippines to enhance the country’s force 
posture in the SCS also have implications for Australia. 
Currently, the GRP is the second-largest recipient of law 
enforcement aid from Canberra, the bulk of which has been 
directed to boosting the professionalism and effectiveness of 
the PNP. Now that the GRP has changed its focus to external 
defence, it could be argued that Australia should realign 
its assistance to make it consistent with Manila’s altered 
priorities. However, apart from being expensive, such a 
course of action would be unwise for at least two reasons.
First, in many ways the PNP remains a relatively weak 
entity. A constable in the Philippines makes between 13,000 
and 15,000 pesos (A$303–350) a month, and until 2013 
was responsible for purchasing his or her own firearm. 
This low rate of pay continues to encourage corruption, 
fostering a culture of opportunist adventurism that affects 
the force’s senior and junior ranks alike. Officers also have 
poor forensic investigative skills and as a result tend to 
rely on human sources and confessions when preparing 
charges against suspects. Because that evidence is often 
extracted under questionable circumstances (defendants 
often claim that they were forced to sign statements under 
duress), it rarely leads to convictions. Additional problems 
include a poor grasp of the fundamentals of community 
The most recent development in the reinvigorated 
American–Filipino security alliance occurred on 28 April 
2014 with the conclusion of the Agreement on Enhanced 
Defense Cooperation. Among other things, the 10-year 
accord permits US troops to access and use designated 
military facilities at the invitation of the GRP (although only 
on a rotational basis) for the dual purposes of promoting 
interoperability and force modernisation in the AFP.65 The 
Obama administration has stressed that the agreement isn’t 
aimed at China and is primarily designed to support more 
effective and coordinated humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief missions. While that may be true, clauses in 
the agreement specifically cover augmenting the Philippines’ 
maritime domain awareness and external defence.66 This 
strongly suggests that at least part of the document’s 
rationale is to underwrite Manila’s claims in the Spratlys and 
surrounding areas.
Certainly, the US has good reason to back the GRP in its 
stand-off with China, as this would help to ensure that the 
PRC isn’t allowed to assume uncontested sovereignty over 
the SCS. Indeed, maintaining freedom of navigation in the 
wider region is now arguably one of Washington’s most 
pressing economic, social and political concerns in Southeast 
Asia, as these waters provide 10% of the global fish catch, 
carry around A$5.3 trillion in annual ship-borne trade and 
are believed to include sizeable oil and natural gas reserves.67 
Philippine defence transformation—in the sense that it 
stymies Beijing’s assumed intentions in the SCS—is thus 
viewed in a positive light. That said, it’s not apparent that 
Washington is willing to fund the process without significant 
financial input from Manila. That was certainly the case 
with past financial assistance for PDR, where allocations 
amounted to only around 10% of the total budgeted 
amount.68 Foreign military funding for the Philippines in 
FY2014—US$50 million69—suggests that there’s been no 
major shift in this calculus.
The Obama administration is also acutely aware of the need 
to avoid any direct policies that would further stress what’s 
already a strained relationship with China. Directly assisting 
the Philippines to acquire modern attack aircraft and combat 
or patrol vessels in the numbers required to offset the PRC’s 
growing military power would undoubtedly inflame tensions 
with Beijing, which has already expressed vocal concerns 
over an apparent American policy of strategic encirclement in 
the Asia–Pacific.
Rebuilding while performing: military modernisation in the Philippines 17
buttressed economic growth. Overall two-way trade has 
increased at an annual average rate of 27% a year and 
currently stands at nearly A$130 billion per year.73
Although economic links are robust, the political relationship 
between Australia and the PRC is not particularly strong, 
largely due to Canberra’s close security ties with the US and 
past government allusions to a ‘China threat.’ Beijing balked 
vociferously at the Australian 2009 Defence White Paper 
(DWP), which specifically referenced the PRC’s military rise as 
a potential cause of concern for the Asia–Pacific.74 While not 
as direct, the 2013 DWP made similar suggestions, this time in 
the context of the SCS and cyber-espionage.75
Adopting an explicit posture of military support for Manila’s 
claims in the Spratlys and wider (self-defined) West 
Philippine Sea would significantly complicate diplomatic 
ties by reinforcing a perception in Beijing that the Australian 
Government is fully committed to working with Washington 
in strategically containing China in the Asia–Pacific. At best, 
this could complicate the consolidation of future economic 
and trade agreements; at worst, it could encourage China to 
search for new (non-Australian) sources of energy resources 
and alternative markets for its exports.
policing, intelligence stovepiping, inadequate intra-agency 
coordination and cooperation, and a lack of discipline in 
preserving the sanctity of crime scenes.70 The Australian 
Federal Police is well placed to address these issues. It has 
instituted several capacity-building and training programs 
over the past 10 years, and these should be continued until 
they make a decisive impact on the PNP’s overall proficiency. 
Prematurely terminating ongoing initiatives would not only 
be a significant waste of resources, it could also lead to a 
domestic enforcement void that once again allows internal 
threat actors to assume prominence.
Second, realigning the direction of its aid could jeopardise 
Australia’s highly beneficial economic relationship with 
China. Around 74% of the PRC’s total mineral imports 
now come from Australia, including 45% of its coal and 
iron ore. Earnings from those commodities were the 
base for the Australian mining boom and are generally 
regarded as the main factor allowing the country to emerge 
from the global financial crisis relatively unscathed.71 
At the same time, Australia has benefited from cheap 
Chinese imports, particularly of clothing, computers, 
telecommunications equipment/parts, toys and games.72 
These low-cost manufactured goods have contributed to a 
highly competitive domestic retail market that has further 
Australian soldiers (C) salute with military troops from the Philippines and United States during the ceremonial opening rites of the Philippines–US War Exercise inside a 
military camp in Quezon City, east of Manila, Philippines, 5 May 2014. © DENNIS M. SABANGAN/epa/Corbis
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